Recently, there has been growing interest around less-restrictive solution concepts than Nash equilibrium in extensive-form games, with significant effort towards the computation of extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) and extensive-form coarse correlated equilibrium (EFCCE). In this paper, we show how to leverage the popular counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) paradigm to induce simple no-regret dynamics that converge to the set of EFCEs and EFCCEs in an n-player general-sum extensive-form games. For EFCE, we define a notion of internal regret suitable for extensive-form games and exhibit an efficient no-internal-regret algorithm. These results complement those for normal-form games introduced in the seminal paper by Hart and Mas-Colell. For EFCCE, we show that no modification of CFR is needed, and that in fact the empirical frequency of play generated when all the players use the original CFR algorithm converges to the set of EFCCEs.
Introduction
The Nash equilibrium (NE) (Nash, 1950) is the most common notion of rationality in game theory, and its computation in two-player, zero-sum games has been the flagship computational challenge in the area at the interplay between computer science and game theory (see, e.g., the landmark results in heads-up no-limit poker by Brown and Sandholm (2017) and Moravčík et al. (2017) ). The assumption underpinning NE is that the interaction among players is fully decentralized. Therefore, an NE is a distribution on the uncorrelated strategy space (i.e., a product of independent distributions, one per player). A competing notion of rationality is the correlated equilibrium (CE) proposed by Aumann (1974) . A correlated strategy is a general distribution over joint action profiles and it is customarily modeled via a trusted external mediator that draws an action profile from this distribution, and privately recommends to each player his component. A correlated strategy is a CE if no player has an incentive to choose an action different from the mediator's recommendation, because, assuming that all other players also obey, the suggested strategy is the best in expectation.
Many real-world strategic interactions involve more than two players with arbitrary (i.e., general-sum) utilities. In these settings, the notion of NE presents some weaknesses which render the CE a natural solution concept: (i) computing an NE is an intractable problem, being PPAD-complete even in two-player games (Chen and Deng, 2006; Daskalakis et al., 2009 ); (ii) the NE is prone to equilibrium selection issues; and (iii) the social welfare than can be attained via an NE may be significantly lower than what can be achieved via a CE (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 1999; Roughgarden and Tardos, 2002) . Moreover, in normal-form games, the notion of CE arises from simple learning dynamics in senses that NE does not (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000; Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006) .
The notion of extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) by von Stengel and Forges (2008) is a natural extension of the CE to the case of sequential strategic interactions. In an EFCE, the mediator draws, before the beginning of the sequential interaction, a recommended action for each of the possible decision points (i.e., information sets) that players may encounter in the game, but she does not immediately reveal recommendations to each player. Instead, the mediator incrementally reveals relevant individual moves as players reach new information sets. At any decision point, the acting player is free to defect from the recommended action, but doing so comes at the cost of future recommendations, which are no longer issued if the player deviates. Another suitable notion of correlation for sequential games has been recently introduced by Farina et al. (2020) as the coarse version of an EFCE. In general, a coarse correlated equilibrium enforces protection against deviations which are independent of the recommended move. Then, in an extensive-form coarse correlated equilibrium (EFCCE), at each information set, the acting player has to commit to following the mediator's recommended move before it is revealed to him.
Original contributions We focus on general-sum sequential games with an arbitrary number of players (including the chance player). In this setting, the problem of computing a feasible EFCE (and, therefore, a feasible EFCCE) can be solved in polynomial time in the size of the game tree (Huang and von Stengel, 2008 ) via a variation of the Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm (Papadimitriou and Jiang and Leyton-Brown, 2015) . However, in practice, this approach cannot scale beyond toy problems. Therefore, the following question remains open: is it possible to devise simple dynamics leading to a feasible EFCE/EFCCE? In this paper, we show that the answer is positive.
First, we define a suitable notion of internal regret and show how to minimize it by decomposing the problem locally at each information set. We propose the ICFR algorithm as a natural extension of the laminar regret decomposition framework to minimize such internal regrets across the game tree. The empirical frequency of play generated by this algorithm converges to an EFCE almost surely in the limit. These results generalize the seminal work by Hart and Mas-Colell (2000) to the sequential case via a simple and natural framework. Celli et al. (2019b) as a simple extension of vanilla CFR (Zinkevich et al., 2008) which keeps track of the empirical frequency of play in order to recover a CE of the sequential game (i.e., a CE defined over the normal-form representation of the game). Surprisingly enough, we show that the empirical frequency of play generated by CFR-S converges to the set of EFCCEs almost surely in the limit. Therefore, relaxing the EFCE constraints to their coarse counterparts yields an even simpler dynamic which renders the EFCCE an appealing notion of rationality for complex multi-player, general-sum sequential problems.
CFR-S was introduced by

Preliminaries
In this section, we provide the needed groundings and definitions on sequential games and regret minimization (see the books by Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2008) and Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006) , respectively, for additional details).
Extensive-Form Games
We focus on extensive-form games (EFGs) with imperfect information. We denote the set of players as P ∪ {c}, where c is a chance player that selects actions according to fixed known probability distributions, representing exogenous stochasticity. An EFG is usually defined by means of a game tree, where H is the set of nodes of the tree, and a node h ∈ H is identified by the ordered sequence of actions from the root to the node. Z ⊆ H is the set of terminal nodes, which are the leaves of the game tree. For every h ∈ H \ Z, we let P (h) be the unique player who acts at h and A(h) be the set of actions she has available. For each player i ∈ P, we let u i : Z → R be his payoff function. Moreover, we denote by p c : Z → (0, 1) the function assigning each terminal node z ∈ Z to the probability p c (z) of reaching it given chance moves on the path from the root of the game tree to z. Finally, we let U be the maximum range of payoffs in the game, i.e., it holds U := max i∈P (max z∈Z u i (z) − min z∈Z u i (z)). Imperfect information is encoded by using information sets (infosets). Given i ∈ P, a player i's infoset I groups nodes belonging to player i that are indistinguishable for him, i.e., A(h) = A(h ′ ) for any pair of nodes h, h ′ ∈ I. I i denotes the set of all player i's infosets, which form a partition of {h ∈ H \ Z | P (h) = i}. Moreover, we let A(I) be the set of actions available at infoset I ∈ I i . As usual in the literature, we assume that the game has perfect recall, i.e., the infosets are such that no player forgets information once acquired. In EFGs with perfect recall, the infosets I i of each player i ∈ P are partially ordered. We write I I ′ whenever infoset I ∈ I i precedes I ′ ∈ I i according to such ordering, i.e., there exists a path in the game tree connecting a node h ∈ I to some node h ′ ∈ I ′ . For the ease of notation, given I ∈ I i , we let C ⋆ (I) be the set of player i's infosets that follow infoset I (this included), defined as C ⋆ (I) := {I ′ ∈ I i | I I ′ }. Moreover, given I ∈ I i and a ∈ A(I), we let C(I, a) ⊆ I i be the set of player i's infosets that immediately follow infoset I by playing action a, i.e., those reachable from some node h ∈ I by following a path that includes a and does not pass through another player i's infoset.
Normal-form plans and strategies. A normal-form plan for player i ∈ P is a tuple π i ∈ Π i := × I∈Ii A(I) which specifies an action for each player i's infoset, where π i (I) represents the action selected by π i at infoset I ∈ I i . We denote with π ∈ Π := × i∈P Π i a joint normal-form plan, defining a plan π i ∈ Π i for each player i ∈ P. The expected payoff of player i ∈ P, when she plays π i ∈ Π i and the opponents play normal-form plans specified by π −i ∈ Π −i := × j =i∈P Π j , is denoted, with an overload of notation, by u i (π i , π −i ) (this also includes the probability of chance moves, as determined by p c ). A normal-form strategy x i ∈ ∆ Πi is a probability distribution over Π i , where x i (π i ) denotes the probability of selecting a plan π i ∈ Π i according to x i . We let X i := ∆ Πi be the set of strategies of player i ∈ P. Moreover, x ∈ X := ∆ Π is a joint probability distribution defined over Π, with x(π) being the probability that the players end up playing the plans prescribed by π ∈ Π.
Sequences. For any i ∈ P, given an infoset I ∈ I i and an action a ∈ A(I), we denote with σ = (I, a) the sequence of player i's actions reaching infoset I and terminating with a. Notice that, in EFGs with perfect recall, such sequence is uniquely determined, as paths that reach nodes belonging to the same infoset identify the same sequnece of player i's actions. We let Σ i := {(I, a) | I ∈ I i , a ∈ A(I)} ∪ {∅ i } be the set of player i's sequences, where ∅ i is the empty sequence of player i (representing the case in which he never plays). Moreover, for the ease of notation, given a sequence σ ∈ Σ i , we let I(σ) ∈ I i be the player i's infoset where the last action in σ is played. Additionally, given an infoset I ∈ I i , we let σ(I) ∈ Σ i be the sequence of player i's actions that identify infoset I.
Subsets of (joint) normal-form plans. We now define certain subsets of Π i . The reader is encouraged to refer to Figure 1 while reading the definitions to see what these subsets equal to in a small example.
For every player i ∈ P and infoset I ∈ I i , we let Π i (I) ⊆ Π i be the set of player i's normal-form plans that prescribe to play so as to reach infoset I whenever possible (depending on the opponents' actions up to that point) and any action whenever reaching I is not possible anymore. Moreover, for every sequence σ = (I, a) ∈ Σ i , we let Π i (σ) ⊆ Π i (I) ⊆ Π i be the set of player i's plans that reach infoset I and recommend action a at I. Similarly, given a terminal node z ∈ Z, we denote with Π i (z) ⊆ Π i the set of normal-form plans by which player i plays so as to reach
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Additional notation. For every i ∈ P and I ∈ I i , we let Z(I) ⊆ Z be the set of terminal nodes that are reachable from infoset I ∈ I i of player i. Moreover, Z(I, a) ⊆ Z(I) ⊆ Z is the set of terminal nodes reachable by playing action a ∈ A(I) at infoset I, whereas Z c (I, a) := Z(I) \ Z(I, a) is the set of the terminal nodes which are reachable by playing an action different from a at I. For any joint normal-form plan π ∈ Π, we denote with ρ π ∈ {0, 1} Z a vector in which each component ρ π z is equal to 1 if and only if z ∈ Z can be reached when the players play according to π. Analogously, given π i ∈ Π i and π −i ∈ Π −i , we define the vectors ρ πi and ρ π−i , while, with an abuse of notation, ρ πi I ∈ {0, 1} is 1 if and only if infoset I ∈ I i can be reached when playing according to π i .
Regret Minimization
In the regret minimization framework (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006) , each player i ∈ P plays repeatedly against the others by making a series of decisions. For each t = 1, . . . , T , let π t i ∈ Π i be the normal-form plan adopted by player i at iteration t. Then, each player i observes a utility defined as u t i :
denotes the normal-form plans played by the opponents at iteration t.
The cumulative (external) regret of player i ∈ P up to iteration T is defined as:
which represents how much player i would have gained by always playing the best plan in hindsight, given the history of utilities observed up to iteration T .
A regret minimizer is a function providing, after each iteration t, the next player i's normal-form plan π t+1 i on the basis of the past history of play and the observed utilities up to iteration t. A desirable property for regret minimizers is Hannan consistency (Hannan, 1957) , which requires that lim sup T →∞ 1 T R T i ≤ 0, i.e., the cumulative regret grows at a sublinear rate in the number of iterations T . There are many regret-minimizing procedures that ensure such property, one is regret matching (RM) (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000) .
We definex T ∈ ∆ Π as the empirical frequency of play up to iteration T , wherex T (π) := |{t≤T |π t =π}| T for every π ∈ Π, with π t denoting the joint normal-form plan in which each player plays π t i . Then, it is well known that, if all the players play according to an Hannan consistent regret-minimizing procedure, thenx T approaches the set of normalform coarse correlated equilibria of the game (Celli et al., 2019b ) (see Section 3 for further details on equilibria).
Extensive-form Correlated and Coarse Correlated Equilibria
In the context of EFGs, the two most widely adopted notions of correlated equilibrium are the normal-form correlated equilibrium (NFCE) (Aumann, 1974) and the extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) (von Stengel and Forges, 2008) . In the former, the mediator draws and recommends a complete normal-form plan to each player before the game starts. Then, each player decides whether to follow the recommended plan or deviate to an arbitrary strategy she desires. In an EFCE the mediator draws a normal-form plan for each player before the beginning of the game, but she does not immediately reveal it to each player. Instead, the mediator incrementally reveals individual moves as players reach new infosets. At any infoset, the acting player is free to deviate from the recommended action, but doing so comes at the cost of future recommendations, which are no longer issued if the player deviates.
A coarse correlated equilibrium enforces protection against deviations which are independent of the recommended move. Players have to decide whether or not to commit to playing according to the recommendations ex ante such recommendations. In a normal-form coarse correlated equilibrium (NFCCE) (Moulin and Vial, 1978) players decide to commit to follow the recommended normal-form plan before actually observing it (i.e., with the only knowledge of the mediator's distribution over joint normal-form plans). Those who decide to commit to following the mediator will privately receive their recommendations, while the remaining players are free to play any desired strategy and they will not receive any recommendation. An extensive-form coarse correlated equilibrium (EFCCE) (Farina et al., 2020) is the coarse equivalent of an EFCE. At each infoset, the acting player has to commit to following the relevant recommended move before it is revealed to her.
In an EFCE, players know less about the normal-form plans that were sampled by the mediator than in an NFCE, where the whole normal-form plan is immediately revealed. Therefore, by exploiting an EFCE, the mediator can more easily incentivize players to follow strategies that may hurt them, as long as players are indifferent as to whether or not to follow the recommendations. This is beneficial when the mediator wants to maximize, e.g., the socialwelfare of the game. For arbitrary EFGs with perfect recall, the following inclusion of the set of equilibria holds: NFCE ⊆ EFCE ⊆ EFCCE ⊆ NFCCE (von Stengel and Forges, 2008; Farina et al., 2020) .
The remainder of the section provides suitable formal definitions of the set of EFCEs and EFCCEs (respectively, Sections 3.1 and 3.2) via the notion of trigger agent (originally introduced by Gordon et al. (2008) and Dudík and Gordon (2009) ). Finally, Section 3.3 summarizes existing approaches for computing EFCEs and EFCCEs.
Formal Definition of the Set of EFCEs
The definition of EFCE requires the following notion of trigger agent, which, intuitively, is associated to each player and sequence of action recommendations for him.
Definition 1 (Trigger agent for EFCE). Given a player i ∈ P, a sequence σ = (I, a) ∈ Σ i , and a probability distributionx i ∈ ∆ Πi(I) , an (σ,x i )-trigger agent for player i is an agent that takes on the role of player i and commits to following all recommendations unless she reaches I and gets recommended to play a. If this happens, the player stops committing to the recommendations and plays according to a plan sampled fromx i until the game ends.
It follows that joint probability distribution x * ∈ X is an EFCE if, for every i ∈ P, player i's expected utility when following the recommendations is at least as large as the expected utility that any (σ,x i )-trigger agent for player i can achieve (assuming the opponents' do not deviate). Given σ = (I, a) ∈ Σ i , in order to express the expected utility of a (σ,x i )-trigger agent, it is convenient to define the probability of the game ending in each terminal node z ∈ Z. Three cases are possible. In the first one, z ∈ Z(I, a) and the probability of reaching z is defined as:
which accounts for the fact that the agent follows recommendations until she receives that one of playing a at I, and, thus, she 'gets triggered' and plays according toπ i sampled fromx i from I onwards. The second case is z ∈ Z c (I, a), which is reached with probability:
where the first term accounts for the event that z is reached when the agent 'gets triggered', while the second term is the probability of reaching z while not being triggered (notice that the two events are independent). Finally, the third case is when z ∈ Z \ Z(I) and the infoset I is never reached. Then, the probability of reaching z is defined as:
The following is the formal definition of EFCE.
Definition 2 (Extensive-form correlated equilibrium). An EFCE of an EFG is a probability distribution x * ∈ X such that, for every i ∈ P and (σ,x i )-trigger agent for player i, with σ = (I, a) ∈ Σ i , it holds:
Noticing that the left-hand side of Equation (5) is equal to z∈Z q(z)u i (z) and that p 2 (z) = p 1 (z) + q(z), we can rewrite Equation (5) as follows:
A probability distribution x * ∈ X is said to be an ǫ-EFCE if, for every i ∈ P and (σ,x i )-trigger agent for player i, with σ = (I, a) ∈ Σ i , it holds:
Formal Definition of the Set of EFCCEs
In a similar way to Farina et al. (2020) , we define the following notion of trigger agent for EFCCEs. Differently from the EFCE case, here an agent 'gets triggered' when an infoset is reached (before observing the action recommendation).
Definition 3 (Trigger agent for EFCCE). Given a player i ∈ P, an infoset I ∈ I i , and a probability distribution x i ∈ ∆ Πi(I) , an (I,x i )-trigger agent for player i is an agent that takes on the role of player i and commits to following all recommendations unless she reaches I. If this happens, the player stops committing to the recommendations and, instead, plays according to a normal-form plan sampled fromx i until the game ends.
Then, a joint probability distribution x * ∈ X is an EFCCE if, for every i ∈ P, player i's expected utility when following the recommendations is at least as large as the expected utility that any (I,x i )-trigger agent for player i can achieve (assuming the opponents' do not deviate either). Following the reasoning adopted to define EFCEs, it is convenient to express the expected utility of a (I,x i )-trigger agent via the probability of the game ending in each z ∈ Z. Two cases are possible. In the first one, z ∈ Z(I) and the probability of reaching z is defined as:
which accounts for the fact that the trigger agent follows recommendations until the infoset I is reached, and, then, she plays according to a planπ i ∈ Π i (I) sampled according tox i from I onwards. The second case is when z ∈ Z \ Z(I) and the infoset I is never reached. Thus, the probability q(z) of getting to z is defined as in Equation (4).
We can now provide the following formal definition of EFCCE.
Definition 4 (Extensive-form coarse correlated equilibrium). An EFCCE of an EFG is a probability distribution x * ∈ X such that, for every i ∈ P and (I,x i )-trigger agent for player i, it holds:
The left-hand side of Equation (9) defines player i's expected utility by following recommendations, while the righthand side is the expected utility of an (I,x i )-trigger agent for player i. Equation (9) can be equivalently rewritten as:
An ǫ-EFCCE is defined analogously, replacing zero with ε in the right-hand side of Equation (10).
Computation of EFCEs and EFCCEs
The problem of computing an optimal EFCE in extensive-form games with more than two players and/or chance moves is known to be NP-hard (von Stengel and Forges, 2008) . However, Huang and von Stengel (2008) show that the problem of finding one EFCE can be solved in polynomial time via a variation of the Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm (Papadimitriou and Jiang and Leyton-Brown, 2015) . This holds for arbitrary EFGs with multiple players and/or chance moves. Unfortunately, that algorithm is mainly a theoretical tool, and it is known to have limited scalability beyond toy problems. Dudík and Gordon (2009) provide an alternative sampling-based algorithm to compute EFCEs. However, their algorithm is centralized and based on MCMC sampling which may limit its practical appeal. Our framework is arguably simpler and based on the classical counterfactual regret minimization algorithm (Zinkevich et al., 2008; Farina et al., 2019a) . Moreover, our framework is fully decentralized since each player, at every decision point, plays so as to minimize her internal/external regret.
If we restrict our attention to two-player perfect-recall games without chance moves, than the problem of determining an optimal EFCE can be characterized through a succint linear program with polynomial size in the game description (von Stengel and Forges, 2008) . In this setting, Farina et al. (2019b) showed that the problem of computing an EFCE can be formulated as the solution to a bilinear saddle-point problem, which they solve via a subgradient descent method. Moreover, Farina et al. (2019c) design a regret minimization algorithm suitable for this specific scenario.
Computing coarse correlated equilibria in arbitrary sequential games is still a largely unexplored problem. Celli et al. (2019a) study the computation of optimal NFCCEs, but their result are mainly theoretical and of limited practical applicability. There exist variations of the CFR algorithm (Zinkevich et al., 2008) that are shown to converge to the set of NFCCEs (Celli et al., 2019b) . However, the problem of computing an EFCCE via regret minimization is still open.
Suitable Notion of Regret for Extensive-Form Games and Convergence to EFCE
In this section, we introduce a new notion of regret whose minimization allows to approach the set of EFCEs in general EFGs (with any number of players, including chance). Our main idea is to define a regret for each trigger agent, i.e., for each player i ∈ P and sequence σ = (I, a) ∈ Σ i . Intuitively, this represents the regret of not having played the best trigger agent's planπ i ∈ Π i (I) in hindsight, taking into account all the iterations in which the agent actually gets triggered (i.e., infoset I is reached and action a is recommended). Then, we show how all these regrets can be minimized by minimizing other regret terms that can be defined locally at each infoset. In particular, our approach follows the line of and extends the laminar regret decomposition framework introduced by Farina et al. (2019a) .
Approaching the Set of EFCEs
First, we introduce our suitably defined notion of regret and show that its minimization allows to approach the set of EFCEs in any EFG. We start with some preliminary definitions.
For each t = 1, . . . , T , we denote with u t i,I : A(I) → R the immediate utility observed by player i ∈ P at infoset I ∈ I i during iteration t. For every action a ∈ A(I), u t i,I (a) represents the utility experienced by player i if the game ends after playing a at I, without passing through another player i's infoset and assuming that the other players play as prescribed by the plans π t For i ∈ P, the following is player i's utility attainable at infoset I ∈ I i when a normal-form planπ i ∈ Π i is selected:
Moreover, for notational convenience, for every I ∈ I i , we define V t I := V t I (π t i ), which represents the utility player i gets at infoset I by means of the normal-form plan π t i played at iteration t. For every player i ∈ P, sequence σ ∈ Σ i , and infoset I ∈ C ⋆ (I(σ)) following that one where the last action of σ is played (this included), we let R T I,σ be the cumulative trigger regret representing the regret at infoset I experienced by the trigger agent that gets triggered on σ, defined as follows:
Notice that R T I,σ only accounts for those iterations in which π t i ∈ Π i (σ), i.e., intuitively, when the actions prescribed by the normal-form plan π t i trigger the agent associated to sequence σ. The following theorem shows that minimizing the internal trigger agent regrets allows to approach the set of EFCEs. Proof. By definition of cumulative trigger regret, we have that for each player i ∈ P and sequence σ = (I, a) ∈ Σ i , it holds almost surely that:
Let us fix i ∈ P and σ = (I, a) ∈ Σ i . By expanding the recursive definition ofV t I (π i ) and recalling the definition of the immediate utility function u t i,I , it is easy to see that the following holds:
Givenx i ∈ ∆ Πi(I) , let us define, for every z ∈ Z(I), the following probabilities:
which are the equivalent of p 1 (z) and q(z) obtained by replacing x * ∈ X with the empirical frequency of playx T . Then, for every normal-form planπ i ∈ Π i (I), it holds:
where the last inequality holds because of Equation (13) expansion. Finally, from the last inequality, using the definition ofp 1 (z) and convexity, for every normal-form strategyx i ∈ ∆ Πi(I) , we get:
On any subsequence wherex T converges, i.e.,x T → x * ∈ X , it holds almost surely that:
The result immediately holds by definition of EFCE.
Internal Laminar Regret Decomposition
Next, we show how the trigger regrets can be minimized by minimizing other suitably defined regrets defined locally at each infoset. In order to define them, we need to introduce, for every player i ∈ P and infoset I ∈ I i , the following parameterized utility function at each iteration t:
which represents the utility that player i gets, at iteration t, by playing action a at I and following the actions prescribed by π t i at the subsequent infosets. Then, for each sequence σ ∈ Σ i , infoset I ∈ C ⋆ (I(σ) ), and action a ∈ A(I), the cumulative laminar trigger regret of action a is defined as:
while, for σ ∈ Σ i and I ∈ C ⋆ (I(σ)), the cumulative laminar trigger regret is:
The following two lemmas show that the trigger regrets can be minimized by minimizing the cumulative laminar trigger regrets at all the infosets of the game.
Lemma 1. The cumulative trigger regret for each sequence σ ∈ Σ i and infoset I ∈ C ⋆ (I(σ)) can be decomposed as:
Proof. By using the recursive definitions of R T I,σ andV t I (π i ), we get:
By rewriting Equation (20) according to Equation (14) we get to the result.
Lemma 2. For every sequence σ ∈ Σ i and infoset I ∈ C ⋆ (I(σ)), it holds:
Proof. Consider an arbitrary sequence σ ∈ Σ i and infoset I ∈ C ⋆ (I(σ)). By Lemma 1 we have: 
By starting from I and applying the above equation inductively, we obtain the result.
Internal Counterfactual Regret Minimization
We propose the internal counterfactual regret minimization algorithm (ICFR) as a way to minimize the trigger laminar regrets (see Algorithm 1). At each iteration t, ICFR selects a normal-form plan π t i by sampling actions according to the strategies prescribed by a group of regret minimizers, one for each infoset.
Algorithm 1 ICFR for player i 1: function ICFR(Γ,i) 2:
Initialize the regret minimizers 3:
t ← 1 4:
while t < T do 5:
π t i ← SAMPLEINTERNAL(I∅) 6:
Observe u t i (i.e., u t i,I (a) for each pair (I, a)) 7:
UPDATEINTERNAL(I∅, π t i , u t i ) 8:
In order to minimize the laminar trigger regrets, ICFR needs to instantiate different regret minimizers for each infoset I ∈ I i . In particular, for every sequence σ = (I, a) ∈ Σ i whose last action a is played at infoset I, the algorithm employs an internal-regret minimizing procedure (see (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006) ) for the regret term R T I,σ . Moreover, the algorithm instantiates an additional external-regret minimizer for the regretR T I,σ for each sequence σ ∈ Σ c i (I), which is the set of sequences that do not reach I and whose last action is played at an infoset that precedes I. Formally, Σ c i (I) := {σ = (I ′ , a) | I ′ ∈ I i , a ∈ A(I ′ ), I ′ I, a / ∈ σ(I)}. See Section 5.1 for more details.
The following is a detailed formal description of the steps involved in the main loop of ICFR:
• SAMPLEINTERNAL: At iteration t, the procedure builds the normal-form plan π t i by recursively visiting player i's infosets. At each infoset I ∈ I i , we define σ t I := σ(I) whenever the (partial) normal-form plan π t i sampled up to this point allows infoset I to be reached. Otherwise, if this not the case, we let σ t I be the unique sequence in Σ c i (I) whose actions are prescribed by the (partial) normal-form plan π t i . Then, the action π t i (I) ∈ A(I) is drawn according to the strategy recommended by the regret minimizer forR t I,σ t I , which is an internal-regret minimizer whenever σ t I = σ(I), while it is an external-regret minimizer otherwise. • UPDATEINTERNAL: At iteration t, for each infoset I ∈ I i , all the regretsR t−1 I,σ are updated as follows. If σ t I = σ(I), then, for the sequence σ = (I, π t i (I)) and for every action a ∈ A(I), the procedure sets:
, the procedure performs the following update for every a ∈ A(I):
.
Correctness of ICFR
In this section, we show that the empirical frequency of playx T obtained via ICFR converges almost surely to an EFCE.
We start with the following auxiliary results.
Lemma 3. For any I ∈ I i of player i, the sequence σ t I defined by SAMPLEINTERNAL of Alg. 1 exists and is unique.
Proof. Whenever σ t I = σ(I) the statement immediately holds. Otherwise, it is enough to proceed from infoset I towards the root of the tree. Eventually, the procedure reaches an infoset I ′ ∈ I i such that π t i ∈ Π i (I ′ ). Then, σ t I is identified by the pair (I ′ , π t i (I ′ )). Then, we can provide our main result.
Theorem 2. The empirical frequency of playx T obtained via ICFR converges almost surely to an EFCE.
Proof. By Theorem 1, it is enough to minimize R T I,σ for each i ∈ P and σ = (I, a) ∈ Σ i . In order to minimize R T I,σ
it is enough to minimizeR T I ′ ,σ for each I ′ ∈ C ⋆ (I(σ)) (Lemma 2). Take an arbitrary infoset I ∈ I i . For any iteration t, there are two cases:
• Case 1: σ t I = σ(I). Then, the laminar trigger regretR t I,σ with σ = (I, π t i (I)) is updated according to the action π t i (I) sampled from a strategy recommended by an internal-regret-minimizing procedure. Moreover, all the regretsR t I,σ(I ′ ) for any I ′ ∈ I i with I ′ I are affected by this choice, while all the other regrets do not change at iteration t by definition (see Equation (15)). Relaxing EFCE constraints to their coarse equivalent significantly simplifies the machinery required to prove convergence to the set of equilibria. For each player i ∈ P and infoset I ∈ I i , we need to minimize the regret of not having played the best trigger agent's planπ i ∈ Π i (I) in hindsight. We show that these regrets can be minimized via the minimization of a laminar regret term local at each infoset (Section 6.1), and that this is enough to obtain convergence almost surely of the empirical frequency of play to the set of EFCCEs (Section 6.2).
For each i ∈ P and I ∈ I i we define the cumulative external regret as the regret experienced at I by the trigger agent that gets triggered when I is reached, which reads:
For each i ∈ P and I ∈ I i , we define a notion of laminar external regret analogously to Farina et al. (2019a) :
Finally, we letR T I := max a∈A(I)R T I,a . The key steps of the CFR-S algorithm are depicted in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 CFR-S for player i 1: function CFR-S(Γ,i) 2:
Initialize laminar regret minimizer for each I ∈ Ii 3:
π t i ← SAMPLE(I∅) 6:
UPDATE(I∅, π t i , u t i ) 8:
The SAMPLE and UPDATE subroutines work as follows:
• SAMPLE: LetR T,+ I,a := max{R T I,a , 0}, and ξ ∈ ∆(A(I)) be a probability distribution over actions available at I proportional to their positive laminar regret. At iteration t, CFR-S selects a ∈ A(I) by sampling it from:
otherwise .
• UPDATE: at iteration t, for each I ∈ I i , CFR-S updatesR t I,a as follows:R t+1 I,a =R t I,a +û t i,I (a)−û t i,I (π t i (I)).
We show that CFR-S provides a sound way to compute an EFCCE, which makes it the first algorithm with convergence guarantees to EFCCEs in arbitrary sequential games (i.e., general-sum games with more than two player and/or chance). Specifically, we have the following:
Theorem 3. The empirical frequency of playx T obtained via CFR-S converges to an EFCCE almost surely for T → ∞.
The theorem easily follows from Lemma 6 and Theorem 4, whose proofs are presented in the remainder of the paper.
Regret Decomposition for EFCCEs
In order to prove Lemma 6, we will make use of the following result.
Lemma 5 (Essentially Lemma 7 by Celli et al. (2019b) ). The cumulative external trigger agent regret at each infoset I ∈ I i can be decomposed as:
Proof. By definition of cumulative external regret at I ∈ I i we have that:
Then, by employing Equation (25), we get
Finally, we obtain the result by rewriting terms according to Equation (14).
CFR-S is known to minimize the cumulative regret experienced by player i (Equation (1) ) via the minimization of the laminar external regret at each infoset in I i (Celli et al., 2019b, Lemma 8) . We strengthen this result by showing that minimizing the laminar external regret at each I ∈ I i guarantees a small cumulative external regret at each infoset of player i. Formally:
Lemma 6. For each i ∈ P and I ∈ I i , the cumulative regret R T I is such that: To simplify the presentation, we present the proof for the case of a game comprising of two players (Player 1 and 2) and chance. The result easily extends to game with more than two players.
First, we need some auxiliary results. We denote by Π 1 , Π 2 , and Π c the sets of normal-form plans for Player 1, Player 2, and the chance player, respectively. Let τ : Π 1 × Π 2 × Π c → Z be a mapping such that τ (π 1 , π 2 , π c ) is the terminal node reached when players follow π 1 , π 2 , and π c . It is easy to see that τ is a function, since τ (π 1 , π 2 , π c ) can be computed with a traversal of a finite tree, where the triplet of plans specifies a deterministic behavior at each node of the game (i.e., each player i behaves according to π i (I) at each infoset I ∈ I i ). Then, we can state the following:
Lemma 8. Let I ∈ I 1 and z, z ′ ∈ Z(Î). For any (π 1 , π 2 , π c ) ∈ Π 1 × Π 2 × Π c , if π 1 ∈ Π 1 (z), π 2 ∈ Π 2 (z ′ ), and π c ∈ Π c (z ′ ), then τ (π 1 , π 2 , π c ) ∈ Z(I).
Proof. Given the triplet (π 1 , π 2 , π c ), suppose to perform a tree traversal to determine τ (π 1 , π 2 , π c ). Therefore, at any infoset I encountered, the acting player i behaves according to π i (I). With a slight overload of notation, we denote with Π i (h) ⊆ Π i the set of normal-form plans by which player i plays so as to reach h ∈ H.
There exists a node h z ′ ∈Î on the path from the root of the game to z ′ , because z ′ ∈ Z(I). Moreover, since the game is modeled as a tree, h z ′ is unique. Player 2 and the chance player are playing to reach the same terminal node z ′ . Then, it holds that π 2 ∈ Π 2 (h z ′ ) and π c ∈ Π c (h z ′ ).
Since Player 1 has perfect recall and I ∈ I 1 , there exists a unique sequence of Player 1's moves leading to I. Therefore, for any h ∈ I, π 1 ∈ Π 1 (h). Specifically, we can write π 1 ∈ Π 1 (h z ′ ). Then, we known that by following the triplet node h z ′ ∈ I is reached. The result immediately follows.
Let be the disjoint union operator. Proof.
(⊆) Take any z ∈ Z(I), π 1 ∈ Π 1 (z), π 2 ∈ Π 2 (z), and π c ∈ Π c (z). Since z ∈ Z(I), we have that π 1 ∈ Π 1 (I).
Moreover, it is immediate to see that (π 2 , π c ) ∈ z∈Z(I) (Π 2 (z) × Π c (z)).
(⊇) Take any π 1 ∈ Π 1 (I) and (π 2 , π c ) ∈ z∈Z(I) (Π 2 (z) × Π c (z)). Letz = τ (π 1 , π 2 , π c ). Then, by Lemma 8, z ∈ Z(I), which implies that π 1 ∈ Π 1 (z), π 2 ∈ Π 2 (z) and π c ∈ Π c (z).
Finally, we can now provide a proof for Lemma 7.
Lemma 7. For any i ∈ P, I ∈ I i , and any (I,x i )-trigger agent, the following holds:
Proof. We provide the proof for the case in which I ∈ I 1 , the other cases are analogous. By Equation (8) 
